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WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE
UNIVERSITY COMMUNITY?
By TERRY F. LUNSFORD*
HE topic assigned to me, when I first came to consider it care-
fully, reminded me of Ambrose Bierce's definition of hash:
"Nobody knows what hash is."' The simple answer to our question
is similar: No one knows who are members of the university com-
munity; neither are we likely to know soon. I will try to explain
briefly why this is so, and what it means to relations between uni-
versities and students.
1. THE USES OF "COMMUNITY" IN THE UNIVERSITY
The question posed by the title is obviously not irrelevant in
discourse of this kind. As most of us know, "community" is a well-
used word in academ6. It is especially common in certain critical
sections of university catalogs and student handbooks. For example:
33. Basis for Discipline.
The University reserves the right to exclude at any time students
whose conduct is deemed undesirable or prejudicial to the University
community's best interest .... 2
Or:
The rules which are included in this booklet are not static and
immutable. They are constantly being evaluated and revised to
remain responsive to the needs of the University community.
3
These examples are typical of many others. Behind such refer-
ences lies a long-standing ideal - the university as a "community of
scholars" - that is cherished by present day academics despite their
institution's size and internal diversity. As one former chancellor at
Berkeley put it: "Our university house has many mansions. Though
the dwellers therein speak in tongues of their specializations, they
belong to a single community of scholarly endeavor." He went on
to add: "Whatever impedes, adulterates, or thwarts that endeavor
is a menace to the mission of the community." 
4
Such notions frequently imply that "scholars" and others in the
university do in fact share a substantial measure of agreement on
*Associate Specialist, Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley; A.B. 1951, J.D. 1957, University of Chicago; M.A.
1966, Ph.D. candidate, University of California, Berkeley.
1 A. BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DicnoNARY 54 (1958).
2University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana Campus, Regulations Applying to All
Undergraduate Students, at 21, Sept. 1967.
3 University of Michigan, Preface to University Regulations, April 17, 1968.
4 Strong, Shared Responsibility, 49 A.A.U.P. BULL. 113 (1963).
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certain central, if rather abstract, values or ideals. One recent version,
for example, lists these ideals as "belief" in
the necessity for order - the order of time, place, and manner...
the life of the mind ... criticism... the emotions... the life of the
spirit... the individual... an ethic of personal honesty... social
responsibility.., the necessity for value judgments ... the provi-
sional nature of all value judgments ... humility and an openness
to change.5
Unhappily, other observers, from Robert Hutchins to Clark Kerr,
have given a different version of reality in the complex, modern
university. Hutchins sadly saw the modern "community of scholars"
abdicating any pretense at a "Great Conversation" about fundamental
issues of civilization, until its unity lay only in a common concern for
the campus heating plant.' Kerr amended this for California purposes
to a "common grievance over parking," but he kept the descriptive
message the same:
The multiversity is an inconsistent institution. It is not one com-
munity but several .... Its edges are fuzzy - it reaches out to
alumni, legislators, farmers, businessmen, who are related to one or
more of these internal communities .... Devoted to equality of
opportunity, it is itself a class society. A community... should
have common interests; in the multiversity, they are quite varied,
even conflicting. It is more a mechanism.. . held together by
administrative rules and powered by money.
7
Empirical research has supported such an impression of diverse and
segmental commitments. Gouldner, in a famous study, found that
even in a modem liberal arts college the "professional" and research-
oriented faculty members were also the most "cosmopolitan," oriented
in their loyalties not to any one college or university but to profes-
sional goals and to their colleagues in separate academic disciplines.8
It is of fundamental importance to current campus conflicts that
this relationship between the ideal of the university as a community
and its reality in the experience of its members has become a major,
explicit issue of heated controversy. From their own experience, and
from the descriptions of commentators no less distinguished than
these, many students are now profoundly skeptical of "community"
as a viable label for the large modern campus. At best, they see its
use as an earnest, anachronistic appeal for return to a time that never
was, when all interests among students, faculty, and the society
could be reconciled without covert or open conflict. At worst, they
5 W. Martin, The University as a Community, in Berkeley: Center for Research and
Development in Higher Education 5-6 (mimeo at Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley).
6
See, e.g., R. HUTCHINS, FREEDOM, EDUCATION AND THE FUND: ESSAYS AND AD-
DRESSES, 1946-1956, at 167-96 (1956).
7C. KERR, THE USES OF THE UNIVERSITY 18-20 (1963). See also Clark, The New
University, AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST, Vol. XI, at 1-5, May-June, 1968.
8 Gouldner, Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles, 2
AD. Sci. Q. 295-97 (1957).
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suspect that it is calculated ideology, designed to obscure the much
more complex moral and political realities of university life.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS: THE UNIVERSITY As BUREAUCRACY
It is by no means accidental that our question is phrased in the
language of community. But it is instructive that such a term has
rarely entered the usage of the courts in discussing academic life.9
Legally, the university is a charitable corporation (if privately con-
trolled and financed) 10 or an instrumentality of the state (if explicitly
"public" in character).." In either case, the organization and man-
agement of its affairs rests largely in the hands of its board of control
(trustees or regents), and is officially executed by administrative
officials.2 Instead of a general "membership," participation in the
university is legally regulated according to a series of specific graded
relations relying mostly on doctrines of contract.
Since our focus here is explicitly on student-institutional rela-
tions, I will not dwell long on other groups of members in the
community. However, it is not irrelevant that there are many and
diverse classes of membership. Regents or trustees are one group;
typically they are appointed or elected as the legal members of the
corporation."3 Major administrative officials usually are appointed
by the board and serve at its pleasure. 14 Faculty members generally
are held to be employees on contract.' " A large number of "research
un-faculty" now are employed on most large university campuses, and
these too have employment contracts for specific services, but few
other emoluments of university membership.'" The same may be said
of the nonacademic personnel, the large white-collar and blue-collar
work forces of the major university corporation. Alumni of the
university - its graduates who received its degrees - are another
group often informally considered members. Technically, they have
9 Cf. Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 871, 57 Cal. Rptr.
463, 467 (1967) (using the term "academic community").
10 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
11 Annot., 65 A.L.R. 1394 (1930). The specific legal characterizations of public univer-
sities vary by state and institution. See T. BLACKWELL, COLLEGE LAW: A GumE FOR
ADMINISTRATION 237-50 (1961).
12 See, e.g., CAL. CoNsT. art. IX, § 9; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3335.02 (Page 1960).
Public institutions are under a variety of controls by state fiscal agents. See generally
M. Moos & F. ROURKE, THE CAMPUS AND THE STATE (1959); Comment, State Uni-
versities -Legislative Control of a Constitutional Corporation, 55 MICH. L. REV. 728
(1957).
13 Foley v. Benedict, 122 Tex. 193, 195, 55 S.W. 2d 805, 808 (1932) ; Chambers, Who
Is the University?, 30 J. HIGHER ED. 320, 324 (1959): "This body -the governing
board, constituting a single artificial person - legally is the university."
14 See Annot., 29 L.R.A. 378, 385 (1895) ; Annot., 140 A.L.R. 1076 (1942).
' 5 Annot, 75 A.L.R. 1352, 1355 (1931).
16 Kruytbosch & Messinger, Unequal Peers: The Situation of Researchers at Berkeley,




no continuing rights of university membership, but in practice there
frequently is an office of the alumni association on the campus, and
typically an officer of the campus administration is charged with
"alumni affairs."
Finally, students are widely thought to have a contractual rela-
tion with their university. In some instances, students are explicitly
advised that this is so. One university information booklet puts it
this way:
The prevailing legal interpretation regarding the rights and privi-
leges of students is that the student who is admitted to the University
contracts with the University to abide by its rules and regulations.
Failure to live up to this contract is sufficient grounds for dis-
ciplinary action o various degrees of severity, the most serious of
which is dismissal of the student.'
7
And courts have so held.' 8 On a closer analysis, however, several
commentators have recently noted that a simple contract theory would
seem to be only one kind of theory relevant to students' legal rights
and obligations in the university.
Levine and others have noted that, were courts to apply contract
doctrine in a thoroughgoing way to student discipline cases, they
might well apply rules of construction appropriate to a "contract of
adhesion," wherein one party has far greater bargaining power than
the other and can effectively set standardized contract terms favorable
to itself.' 9 In such cases, the weaker party has little choice in varying
the terms of the agreement; he can only "adhere" to the other's terms
or reject the bargain altogether. Consequently, courts frequently
construe contracts of adhesion - e.g., the standard insurance contract
- against the party that dictated their terms, assigning him the
burden of proof as to breach of the contract and as to the meaning
of the terms to be construed. 0 Such a burden might prove extremely
heavy in construing the meaning of some terms in university-student
"contracts," such as a right to expel students "for any reason deemed
sufficient." 
1
Other commentators have suggested that the legal relation of
students to their university is not one of contract but one of status -
17 Senate Committee on Student Discipline, University of Illinois, Undergraduate Student
Discipline at the University of Illinois, at 3, April 1968.
18 Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909)
People ex rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hosp. Medical College, 60 Hun. 107, 14 N.Y.S. 490
(Sup. Ct. 1891). See 35 COLUM. L. RjEv. 898, 899 (1935).
19 Note, Private Government on the Campus - Judicial Review of University Expul-
sions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362, 1377 (1963); Developments in the Law - Academic Free-
dom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045 (1968).
20 Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion -Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943) ; cf. Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231
N.Y.S.2d 410, ajfd mem., 12 N.Y.2d 802, 187 N.E.2d 18, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962).
2 1 See Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487, 489, 231 N.Y.S. 435, 438 (1928).
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"participation in a pre-established social pattern"2  with broadly
unspecified terms, the indicia of which the courts recognize on the
basis of common knowledge and popular attitudes. Such a theory is
given credence by recent judicial discussions that specify no relation
of students to their university, except that they are subject to rules
made by the university's officials. Two writers in recent years have
suggested that a specific status-relation be specified by the courts -
that students be considered beneficiaries of a trust imposed upon the
university as fiduciary agent.23 No court has so far adopted such a
theory. Rather, mention of the university's "trust" in the literature
of law and administration suggests that its beneficiaries are not
properly its students but the general public and its other benefactors.24
Whatever the specific theory invoked, however, the general
reasoning of courts has been the same in many essentials for some
years. Thus, university officials have a duty to make and enforce
rules designed to serve the purposes of the educational institution.
These rules and their enforcement cannot be arbitrary or violate con-
stitutional rights. But "reasonable restrictions on the freedoms of
speech and assembly are recognized in relation to public agencies
[including universities] that have a valid interest in maintaining
good order and proper decorum." 25 What is reasonable and what is
not will be determined in the circumstances of the specific case.
And the courts will not presume that discipline has been irregular;
rather, they will limit the scope of their review on the ground that
"the subtle fixing of... limits [on student freedoms] should, in a
large measure, be left to the educational institution itself." 26
The result in cases of university expulsions for misconduct has
been ad hoc, case-by-case reasoning within very broad and largely
unhelpful doctrines. By careful analogic reasoning from the facts of
particular cases, lawyers may discern limits to the university's power
of exclusion. For example, exclusion or expulsion of a student on the
basis of race is unreasonable, and some elements of due process are
required.27  Several commentators have recently made this kind of
22Note, supra note 19, at 1369.
23 Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARv. L. REV. 1406 (1957) ; Gold-
man, The University and the Liberty of Its Students -A Fiduciary Theory, 54 Ky.
L.J. 643 (1966).
24 Marquette University, Student Handbook, 1967-1968, at 24. It should be noted that
the status of beneficiary is a protected but subordinate one, presuming the trustee's
superior knowledge about the best interests of the beneficiary who is presumed to be
incompetent in this regard. A status such as "citizen" or "member" connotes something
far different, including both status-obligations and status-rights, including a share in
the conduct of an association's (inescapably political) affairs.
2 Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 874, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463,
471 (1967).
20 Id. at 875, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 472.




reasoning.2 8 But it is important to note the difficulty in performing
these lawyer-like tasks. Laymen before the law - including most
university administrators, faculty members, and students - have little
chance of gauging the constitutionality of a disciplinary action before
the fact. Not even a "clear and present danger" test guides their
judgment in this area; the manifold circumstances must be judged
against even less specific standards. In the diverse world of the
modern university, this is no easy task for anyone on the campus.
In sum, the law leaves student rights and obligations largely to
the internal processes of the institution, which is legally a bureaucratic
corporation. The social or institutional character of the university
therefore is critical in determining what those rights and obligations
are and how they are perceived. In that context, the apparent reason-
ableness and the enforceability of the university's informal norms are
vitally affected by the fact that the university is widely experienced
as something other than a "community," while university officials
continue to insist that it is one.
III. ACCESS TO UNIVERSITY FAcILITES
As I have mentioned, university membership is relevant to such
questions as, Who may be expelled from membership, and on what
theories? A second set of issues concerns who may be excluded from
using university facilities.
The modern urban university with its multiple functions, its
large and attractive campus, its rooms designed for meetings and
discussions, its pleasant open spaces, and its "audiences" of intelligent
members is a natural focus of attention for outsiders. Its activities
and many of its policies contemplate a regular flow of visitors -
faculty members and students of sister institutions, parents of enrolled
students, taxpayers or contributors touring "their" campus, customers
at on-campus films, concerts, lectures, and museums.
Most of this flow is invited, encouraged, and welcomed by the
official university structure. I suppose that the intercollegiate football
game is the most obvious example of an activity only distantly related
to intellectual purposes for which universities and whole university
towns are willing to suspend much normal operation, to set up special
traffic flows, and to arrange special relationships between city police
and campus officials for the handling of law-breaking "pranksters."
Other regular campus visitors, such as the nonstudents who par-
ticipate in the overt political life of the large campus, are more
2 Note, supra note 19; Van Alstyne, Student Academic Freedom and the Rule-Making
Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations, 2 LAw IN TRAN-
sITION Q. 1 (1965).
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controversial. Present concern with the question of who are members
of the university community arises most of all, I suspect, from the
problem that university authorities have in dealing with such campus
disorders as political rallies, protest demonstrations, and symbolic
challenges to campus rules or practices. In reacting to these dis-
turbances, some public officials have chosen to emphasize the pres-
ence of nonstudents among the protesters, implying that they are
the principal instigators, or the essential "cadres" of troublemakers,
who basically cause the protests on campus.
Such thinking evidently weighed heavily with the California
legislature when, in 1965 (after the Free Speech Movement at
Berkeley), it enacted a new criminal trespass statute (known locally
as the Mulford Act) applying specifically to state colleges and to the
University. That Act made it a misdemeanor for any person who is
"not a student or officer or employee of a state college or university,
and who is not required by his employment to be on the campus," to
refuse a campus official's request to leave, if it "reasonably appears"
to the official that the person is committing or has entered the campus
for the purpose of committing "any act likely to interfere with the
peaceful conduct" of the university."9
This approach was also followed by University officials during
the Berkeley sit-in of November 1966, which arose over a special
location in the lower lobby of the Student Union assigned to Navy
recruiting officers by the administration. Some five hours after that
incident began, the city police were called in. They consulted with
campus administrators and then arrested only seven persons, all non-
students, said by police officers to be leaders of the demonstration.
Faculty members and students present told a different story - that
some of those arrested had in fact been far less involved than many
students who were not disciplined at all. A three-day campus "strike"
followed.
In such a context, asking who are members of the university
community becomes tantamount to asking who may be treated sum-
marily. In other words, Who can be ejected from the campus or
arrested for criminal trespass, without having to consider any rights
he may have as a university member? One difficulty with this ap-
proach - not a theoretical but an eminently practical difficulty -
is that typically the nonstudents in question are not simply "outside
agitators" who have come to practice their demagoguery on innocent
and otherwise satisfied community members. Usually, they are former
students. Often, they are also future students, provided their "mis-
conduct," deriving from political and moral convictions, does not
2 CAL. PENAL CODE § 602.7 (West Supp. 1967).
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make them ineligible for admission.80 They are, not infrequently,
more authentic members of the community with which the students
identify than most of us who are employed by the university in of-
ficial capacities.
The Mulford Act, which has not yet been tested in court, raises
a number of constitutional questions.8 Some of these concern the
meaning and breadth of the standard of "reasonable appearance" as
an official apprehension of "likely" or intended "interference."
Others concern the types of activity most likely to be seen as "inter-
ference" (including possible injury to persons or property, but also
speech and assembly) and the high standards that legally must be
applied to prior restraints on such activity. The issue that bears most
directly on our central focus here is that of equal protection of the
laws. The question may fairly be put: Why single out those not en-
rolled in the university or employed by it for special restrictions
going far beyond the "time, place, and manner" requirements placed
on student expression by the administration? Addressing this issue,
the California Legislative Counsel felt it sufficient to assert:
It is reasonable to establish as a class, persons other than stu-
dents, officers, or employees of a state college or a state university,
in light of the object of such a classification, namely the preservation
of the peaceful conduct of campus activities of which students,
officers and employees of a campus form an integral part, which
cannot be said to be the case with persons generally.82
It may well be that the Counsel is correct in supposing that
the courts would accept such a bald and general assumption as self-
evidently "reasonable." Time will tell - time, and the facts of the
cases on which the issue is raised. If so, however, much of the reality
of modern university life will have been ignored. Nonstudents from
the areas surrounding such university campuses are a rich source of
talent for campus activities, participation in student musical, artistic,
and literary exploration, and work and enthusiasm for student organi-
zations. Recognizing this, some universities' regulations provide
routinely for a proportion of nonstudent memberships in "recog-
nized student organizations. "'8 It is no longer uncommon for students
at major academic centers to drop their university registration for
several months or a year at a time to earn money, to work in civil
rights causes, or merely to consider their own futures more carefully
30See Heist, Intellect and Commitment: The Faces of Discontent, in ORDER AND FREE-
DOM ON THE CAMPUS 61-70 (0. Knorr & W. Minter eds. 1965) on the abilities and
intellectual commitments of students in the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley.
31 See generally Comment, The University and the Public: The Right of Access by Non-
students to University Property, in Symposium: Student Rights and Campus Rules, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 132 (1966).
32 Opinion of Legislative Counsel, No. 17766 (Apr. 30, 1965), ASSEMBLY DAILY JOUR-
NAL 3443-48 (May 17, 1965).
3 University of Michigan, University Regulations 5 (1968).
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before continuing formal study. Some educators seem to favor in-
creasing and explicitly valuing such "moratoria" in today's long
train of formalized learning. Many nonstudents are more studious
by far than the average enrolled sophomore and remain deeply
involved in the intellectual and cultural lives of their university.
They are members of its "community" in the best sense of the uni-
versity tradition.
There are more technical difficulties as well. Is the large uni-
versity free to treat certain members of the public as trespassers
whenever an administrative official judges that they are "likely to
interfere" with unspecified campus activities? The danger in such
an approach is illustrated by a recent New York case. 4 While
attempting to register their children at a city school, a group of
Negro parents (and one nonparent) were arrested for loitering near
the school grounds, under a statute that forbids anyone to remain
"in or about any school, college or university buildings or grounds
without written permission from the principal, custodian or other
person in charge thereof, or in violation of posted rules or regulations
governing the use thereof .... ." The court noted that the statute had
been enacted to control sex molesters of small children, purveyors of
narcotics, and "idlers and troublemakers in general." The judge found
the attempted registration a "legitimate purpose," even though it led
to a heated dispute with school authorities, and emphasized that the
mothers in question could not be compared to "those unsavory young
men" whom the statute was intended to include. " But the school
authorities and the arresting officers evidently had not seen it that way
until the court's decision.
At the root of much campus mistrust today is the expectation
(widely shared) that university administrators, when in doubt, will
"play it safe" with public opinion and use vague laws or regulations
to err on the side of the established organization against the interests
of individuals or minority groups pressing for change. This tendency
may result from a good-faith belief that the official's first responsi-
bility (legally and morally) is to the organization as it stands, and
that he must safeguard its established interests above all. This is the
viewpoint that the jurisprude Edmond Cahn called "the official per-
spective. "3 7 He saw it as an occupational disease of those whose
jobs require them to be "processors" of people in systems, a per-
spective that always takes as first and foremost the needs of the
system itself. Sociologists would say that, where this occurs, the
34 People ex rel. Bailey v. Dennis, 208 N.Y.S.2d 522 (New Rochelle City Ct. 1960).
35 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 722-b (McKinney 1955).
36 People ex rel. Bailey v. Dennis, 208 N.Y.S.2d 522 (New Rochelle City Ct. 1960).
37 Cahn, Law in the Consumer Perspective, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1963).
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organization as such is becoming an end in itself, "displacing its
goals" and the ideals for which it was created.88 In the loosely co-
ordinated institution of higher learning, difficult judgments must
frequently be made about this interplay of the organization's inter-
ests and institutional ideals of free thought and criticism. The mani-
fest political implications of those decisions have engendered much
of the recent excitement on our nation's campuses.
Beyond the temptation for abuses in enforcement, however, are
other issues. Does the university invite the general public to its
campus by holding public events there? How public and notorious
are the many uses of the large university campus by members and
outsiders alike? The burgeoning "city of intellect" today is a de facto
place of residence and work for many thousands of persons. 9 Can
its officials summarily exclude those who wish to communicate their
ideas to its inhabitants, or forbid those inhabitants the right to hear
all manner of controversial ideas freely expressed? 40 Is the property
of the university campus "dedicated" to such narrow purposes that
administrators may exclude some speech and expression even though
it is of intense interest to many of those required by their employment
or studies to be on the campus?
In this area again, the law is not clear.4 ' Few cases have been
adjudicated concerning the uses that may be made of university
property specifically, and the applicability of doctrines drawn for
other types of property is very uncertain.42 Again, the courts' choices
of gross analogies, and the effect of test-case facts upon these choices,
will likely determine many an issue as this sphere of law develops.
IV. STA .LITY AND CHANGE IN THE CAMPUS LEGAL ORDER
Thus, there exists no magic formula, no simple rule of inclusion
and exclusion that will determine reliably who is legitimately on
the campus rather than trespassing or loitering there. As with the
issue of university expulsions, administrators, students, and others
who participate in university life are left largely to the dynamics of
their own daily social relations. At certain critical points, when
students bent on civil disobedience are expelled too summarily, or
when nonstudents intimately involved in campus life are arrested for
38 See, e.g., R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 199 (rev. ed. 1967).
39 This trend is expected to continue. Graubard, University Cities in the Year 2000, 96
DAEDALUS 817-22 (1967).
4 0
See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) ; Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946)
Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery Wkrs. Local 31, 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921,
40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965).
41 Comment, supra note 31.
42 See, e.g., Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885




campus protest activity, substantial numbers of students and faculty
members in the major universities may be expected to respond with
genuine outrage. Such official actions are widely seen as mere
pretexts, manipulations of the letter of the law for the achievement
of immediate and highly political purposes - the enforcement of
short-run campus order as administrative officials conceive it to be.
Not all of the protesters' actions are condoned, nor is a majority of
the campus always willing to go on strike. But expedient, legalistic
maneuvers themselves tend to arouse sympathies for the demon-
strastors. And recent events, such as those at Columbia University,
suggest that there will frequently be strong disagreement on whether
the level and type of disorder in question is so disruptive that it
justifies strong disciplinary action, especially if the issue underlying
the protest is widely seen as legitimate.
Such incidents, more than most others, tend to amplify the sense
of frustration with campus bureaucracy, dissension, and arbitrariness.
For it must not be forgotten that students and nonstudents together
have changed the student's relation to his university dramatically in
the past few years by the very tactics of disturbance, interference,
and challenge to formal authority.
Thus, despite the youthful energies that they engage, most of the
disorders current on our campuses are not merely pranks, not panty
raids, not mere malicious mischief. They involve issues of the most
fundamental importance and difficulty for all of us. Symbolic dis-
order and rulebreaking are being used openly and explicitly to "get
a hearing" from university and government officials on specific issues.
Morever, it is rare that such disorders have not been effective to
some degree in achieving changes of the kind being sought, after
many futile requests through normal channels have been politely
considered and refused, or merely ignored. The situation cannot be
overemphasized; it is the reason why this conference was held. These
situations also reveal much about the current relationship of law to
the social context of campus life.
A legal order is not just a body of rules, but a social order
involving many informal customs, understandings, and other unspeci-
fied but implicitly assumed patterns of cooperation and competition.
In the regular acceptance of these common understandings lies the
"trust" that is the glue of a social system, allowing its members many
mistakes and adjustments without threatening the order as a whole.
This is emphatically the case for any order that aspires to be thought
of as a community. It is these implicit understandings that have been
eroded in the modern university, leaving the official "organization"
chart to stand forth repeatedly as a naked skein of vague, semi-
arbitrary rules and formalized, impersonal relationships. Where a
1968
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social order lacks such understandings and rules that have a generally
understood meaning, there may still be administration - the hier-
archical management of arrangements necessary for the most efficient
production of goods or services. But there is little assurance of a
general sense of community. Instead, the model of private govern-
ment becomes much more persuasive to participants in the order;
they tend to develop concern for a separation of powers, to become
cautious about trusting the benevolence of official power, and to seek
legal restraints on the exercise of untrammelled administrative
discretion. This, I suggest, is what has occurred to many student
and faculty members of the modern university.
43
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At Berkeley in 1964, when student activists first transferred the
tactic of principled civil disobedience from the Southern lunch-
counters to the university campus, they discovered the first of many
Inonrules" by which our large campuses have been run for many
years. The state laws and state constitutional provisions that were
said to forbid certain kinds of student political expression on campus
proved not to do so when students pressed the issue beyond polite dis-
cussion. Instead, students saw revealed the tenuous character of
many administrative judgments about the order necessary for a
university campus. That lesson was not lost when campus conflict
progressed to issues concerning the rights of students and non-
students before campus disciplinary authorities and the criminal
courts. Coupled with the newly visible (but longstanding) inequali-
ties among status groups in the broader society, these lessons from
campus protest have produced in many young people a whole new
awareness of the relationships between social and legal change.
Courts have reasoned about student obligations by inference
from the needs of individual universities for reasonable order. But
they have begun by logically placing each university as a member of
a class of "educational institutions" having supposedly characteristic
and well-understood purposes in light of which reasonable and nec-
essary rules are typically made and accepted. Against this general
social conception, each student has stood as a weak and rather lonely
figure, trying to enforce a "contract," the terms of which he never
made. Mass action by students (enrolled and unenrolled) has
changed this balance of bargaining power. Consequently, we have
entered a turbulent period of explicit "status politics" in the uni-
versity, as students press for delineation of status-rights to go with
4 3 See UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY, REPORT OF THE STUDY COMMISSION
ON UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE, THE CULTURE OF THE UNIVERSITY: GOVERNANCE
AND EDUCATION (Jan. 15, 1968).
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their obligations for social conformity. The changes wrought already
have been great, but the costs have also been great - including major
disruptions for great universities and jail terms, fines, and stunted
careers for many talented and highly moral young people.
The process shows few signs of stopping now; the contending
parties are too far apart on the terms in which a discourse might be
held. Many painful accommodations and compromises remain to be
made, and it can only be hoped that the costs on both sides will soon
lessen. If universities genuinely honor their own autonomy and
value justice as well as order on their campuses, there is good hope
that this will be so.
